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To sketch an institutional approach, this paper elaborates ideas presented over 20 
years ago in The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life 
(March and Olsen 1984). 
 
Institutionalism, as that term is used here, connotes a general approach to the 
study of political institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses 
concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political 
agency, performance and change. Institutionalism emphasizes the endogenous 
nature and social construction of political institutions. Institutions are not simply 
equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual actors or arenas 
for contending social forces. They are collections of structures, rules and 
standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political 
life. 
 





















An institutional perspective 
An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded 
in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover 
of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of 
individuals and changing external circumstances (March and Olsen 1989, 1995). There 
are constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behavior for specific actors in 
specific situations. There are structures of meaning, embedded in identities and belongings: 
common purposes and accounts that give direction and meaning to behavior, and explain, 
justify and legitimate behavioral codes. There are structures of resources that create 
capabilities for acting. Institutions empower and constrain actors differently and make 
them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of appropriateness. 
Institutions are also reinforced by third parties in enforcing rules and sanctioning non-
compliance.1  
 
While the concept of institution is central to much political analysis, there is wide 
diversity within and across disciplines in what kinds of rules and relations are construed 
as “institutions” (Goodin 1996: 20). Moreover, approaches to political institutions differ 
when it comes to how they understand (a) the nature of institutions, as the organized 
setting within which modern political actors most typically act, (b) the processes that 
translate structures and rules into political impacts, and (c) the processes that translate 
human behavior into structures and rules and establish, sustain, transform or eliminate 
institutions.  
 
Institutionalism, as that term is used here, connotes a general approach to the study of 
political institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations 
between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and change. 
Institutionalism emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political 
institutions. Institutions are not simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, 
calculating individual actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are collections 
of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role 
in political life.  
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Institutionalism comes in many flavors, but they are all perspectives for understanding 
and improving political systems. They supplement and compete with two other broad 
interpretations of politics. The first alternative is a rational actor perspective which sees 
political life as organized by exchange among calculating, self-interested actors. The 
second alternative is a cultural community perspective which sees political life as 
organized by shared values and worldviews in a community of common culture, 
experience and vision. The three perspectives – institutional, rational actors and cultural 
community - are not exclusive. Most political systems can be interpreted as functioning 
through a mix of organizing principles. Nor are the perspectives always easy to 
distinguish.  True believers in any one of the three can reduce each of the other two to the 
status of a “special case” of their preferred alternative.  Pragmatically, however, the three 
perspectives are different. They focus attention on different aspects of political life, on 
different explanatory factors, and on different strategies for improving political systems.   
 
The key distinctions are the extent to which a perspective views the rules and identities 
defined within political institutions as epiphenomena that mirror environmental 
circumstances or predetermined individual preferences and initial resources; and the 
extent to which a perspective pictures rules and identities as reproduced with some 
reliability that is, at least in part, independent of environmental stability or change.   
 
Within an institutional perspective, a core assumption is that institutions create elements 
of order and predictability. They fashion, enable and constrain political actors as they act 
within a logic of appropriate action. Institutions are carriers of identities and roles and 
they are markers of a polity’s character, history and visions. They provide bonds that tie 
citizens together in spite of the many things that divide them. They also impact 
institutional change, and create elements of “historical inefficiency”.  
 
Another core assumption is that the translation of structures into political action and 
action into institutional continuity and change, are generated by comprehensible and 
routine processes. These processes produce recurring modes of action and organizational 
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patterns. A challenge for students of institutions is to explain how such processes are 
stabilized or destabilized, and which factors sustain or interrupt ongoing processes.  
 
To sketch an institutional approach, this paper elaborates ideas presented over 20 years 
ago in “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life” (March and 
Olsen 1984). The intent of the article was to suggest some theoretical ideas that might 
shed light on particular aspects of the role of institutions in political life. The aspiration 
was not to present a full-blown theory of political institutions, and no such theory is 
currently available. The ideas have been challenged and elaborated over the last 20 
years,2 and we continue the elaboration, without making an effort to replace more 
comprehensive reviews of the different institutionalisms, their comparative advantages 
and the controversies in the field.3  
  
Theorizing political institutions 
 
The status of institutionalism in political science has changed dramatically over the last 
50 years - from an invective to the claim that “we are all institutionalists now” (Pierson 
and Skocpol 2002: 706). The behavioral revolution represented an attack upon a tradition 
where government and politics in which primarily understood in formal-legal institutional 
terms. The focus on formal government institutions, constitutional issues and public law 
was seen as “unpalatably formalistic and old-fashioned” (Drewrey 1996: 191), and a 
standard complaint was that this approach was “relatively insensitive to the nonpolitical 
determinants of political behavior and hence to the nonpolitical bases of governmental 
institutions” (Macridis 1963: 47). The aspiration was to penetrate the formal surface of 
governmental institutions and describe and explain how politics “really works” (Eulau 
and March 1969: 16).  
 
Theorizing political institutions, Polsby, for example, made a distinction between seeing 
a legislature as an “arena” and as “transformative”. The distinction reflected variation in 
the significance of the legislature; its independence from outside influence and its 
capacity to mould and transform proposals from whatever source into decisions. In an 
arena-legislature, external forces were decisive; and one did not need to know anything 
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about the internal characteristics of the legislature in order to account for processes and 
outcomes. In a transformative-legislature, internal structural factors were decisive. Polsby 
also suggested factors that made it more or less likely that a legislature would end up as 
an arena, or as a transformative institution (Polsby 1975: 281, 291-2).  
 
More generally, students of politics have observed a great diversity of organized settings, 
collectivities and social relationships within which political actors have operated. In 
modern society the polity is a configuration of many formally organized institutions that 
define the context within which politics and governance take place.  Those configurations 
vary substantially; and although there are dissenters from the proposition, most political 
scientists probably would grant that the variation in institutions account for at least some 
of the observed variation in political processes and outcomes. For several centuries, the 
most important setting has been the territorial state; and political science has attended to 
concrete political institutions, such as the legislature, executive, bureaucracy, judiciary 
and the electoral system. 
 
Our 1984 article invited a reappraisal of how political institutions could be 
conceptualized, to what degree they have independent and endurable implications, the 
kinds of political phenomena they impact, and how institutions emerge, are maintained 
and change.  
 
First, we argued for the relative autonomy and independent effects of political 
institutions and for the importance of their organizational properties. We argued 
against understanding politics solely as reflections of society (contextualism) or as 
the macro aggregate consequences of individual actors (reductionism).  
 
Second, we claimed that politics was organized around the interpretation of life 
and the development of meaning, purpose and direction, and not only around 
policy-making and the allocation of resources (instrumentalism).  
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Third, we took an interest in the ways in which institutionalized rules, norms, and 
standard operating procedures impacted political behavior, and argued against 
seeing political action solely as the result of calculation and self-interested 
behavior (utilitarianism).  
 
Fourth, we held that history is “inefficient” and criticized standard equilibrium 
models assuming that institutions reach a unique form conditional on current 
circumstances and thus independent of their historical path (functionalism). 
  
In this view, a political order is created by a collection of institutions that fit more or less 
into a coherent system. The size of the sector of institutionalized activity change over 
time and institutions are structured according to different principles (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967, Eisenstadt 1965). The varying scopes and modes of institutionalization 
affect what collectivities are motivated to do and what they are able to do. Political actors 
organize themselves and act in accordance with rules and practices which are socially 
constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. By virtue of these rules and 
practices, political institutions define basic rights and duties, shape or regulate how 
advantages, burdens and life-chances are allocated in society, and create authority to 
settle issues and resolve conflicts.  
 
Institutions give order to social relations, reduce flexibility and variability in behavior, 
and restrict the possibilities of a one-sided pursuit of self-interest or drives (Weber 1978: 
40-43).  The basic logic of action is rule following – prescriptions based on a logic of 
appropriateness and a sense of rights and obligations derived from an identity and 
membership in a political community and the ethos, practices and expectations of its 
institutions.4 Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and 
legitimate. Members of an institution are expected to obey, and be the guardians of, its 
constitutive principles and standards (March and Olsen 1989, 2006). 
 
Institutions are not static; and institutionalization is not an inevitable process; nor is it 
unidirectional, monotonic or irreversible (Weaver and Rockman 1993). In general, 
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however, because institutions are defended by insiders and validated by outsiders, and 
because their histories are encoded into rules and routines, their internal structures and 
rules cannot be changed arbitrarily (March and Olsen 1989, Offe 2001). The changes that 
occur are more likely to reflect local adaptation to local experience and thus be both 
relatively myopic and meandering, rather than optimizing, as well as “inefficient”, in the 
sense of not reaching a uniquely optimal arrangement (March 1981). Even when history 
is relatively “efficient”, the rate of adaptation is likely to be inconsistent with the rate of 
change in the environment to which the institution is adapting.   
 
  Institutional impacts on political actors and outcomes 
Although it is argued that much of the “established wisdom” about the effects of political 
institutions is very fragile (Rothstein 1996: 155), scholars who deal with political 
institutions are generally less concerned with whether institutions matter, than to what 
extent, in what respects, through what processes, under what conditions, and why 
institutions make a difference (Weaver and Rockman 1993, Egeberg 2003, 2004, Orren 
and Skowronek 2004). In this tradition, institutions are imagined to organize the polity 
and to have an ordering effect on how authority and power is constituted, exercised, 
legitimated, controlled and redistributed. They affect how political actors are enabled or 
constrained and the governing capacities of a political system. Institutions simplify 
political life by ensuring that some things are taken as given.  Institutions provide codes 
of appropriate behavior, affective ties, and a belief in a legitimate order. Rules and 
practices specify what is normal, what must be expected, what can be relied upon, and 
what makes sense in the community, i.e. what a normal, reasonable and responsible (yet 
fallible) citizen, elected representative, administrator, or judge, can be expected to do in 
various situations. 
 
It is commonplace to observe that the causal relation between institutional arrangements 
and substantive policy is complex. Usually, causal chains are indirect, long and 
contingent (Weaver and Rockman 1993), so that political institutions can be expected to 
constrain and enable outcomes without being be the immediate and direct cause of public 
policy. The same arrangement can have quite different consequences under different 
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conditions.  The disentanglement of institutional effects is particularly difficult in multi-
level and multi-centered institutional settings, characterized by interactions among 
multiple autonomous processes (Orren and Skowronek 2004, March and Olsen 2006). 
 
One cluster of speculations about the effects of institutions focuses on rules and routines. 
The basic building blocks of institutions are rules, and rules are connected and sustained 
through identities, through senses of membership in groups and recognition of roles.   
Rules and repertoires of practices embody historical experience and stabilize norms, 
expectations and resources; they provide explanations and justifications for rules and 
standard ways of doing things (March and Olsen 1989, 1995). Subject to available 
resources and capabilities, rules regulate organizational action.  That regulation, however, 
is shaped by constructive interpretations embedded in a history of language, experience, 
memory and trust (Dworkin 1986, March and Olsen 1989). The openness in 
interpretation means that while institutions structure politics and governance and create a 
certain “bias” (Schattschneider 1960), they ordinarily do not determine political behavior 
or outcomes in detail. Individuals may, and may not, know what rules there are and what 
they prescribe for specific actors in specific situations. There may be competing rules and 
competing interpretations of rules and situations.  Indeed, the legitimacy of democratic 
political institutions is partly based on the expectation that they will provide open-ended 
processes without deterministic outcomes (Pitkin 1967). 
 
A central theme of organization theory is that identification and habituation are 
fundamental mechanisms in shaping behavior.  In institutionalized worlds actors are 
socialized into culturally defined purposes to be sought, as well as modes of appropriate 
procedures for pursuing the purposes (Merton 1938: 676).  Members of an organization 
tend to become imbued not only with their identities as belonging to the organization but 
also with the various identities associated with different roles in the organization.  
Because they define themselves in terms of those identities, they act to fulfill them rather 
than by calculating expected consequences (Simon 1965: 115, 136). 
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Observing that political actors sometimes deviate from what rules prescribe, institutional 
scholars have distinguished between an institutional rule and its behavioral realization in 
a particular instance (Apter 1991). They have sought an improved understanding of the 
types of humans selected and formed by different types of institutions and processes, how 
and why different institutions achieve normative reliability (Kratochwil 1984), and under 
what institutional conditions political actors are likely to be motivated and capable of 
complying with codes of appropriate behavior. The co-existence of the logic of 
appropriateness and the logic of consequences, for example, also raises questions about 
how the two interact, which factors determine the salience of different logics, and the 
institutional conditions under which each logic are likely to dominate.5   
 
With whom one identifies, is affected by factors such as how activities are subdivided in 
an organization, which positions individuals have and their responsibilities. It makes a 
difference how interaction, attention, experience and memory are organized, the degree to 
which goals are shared and the number of individual needs satisfied by the organization. 
Identification is also affected by tenure and turnover, the ratio of veterans to newcomers, 
opportunities for promotion and average time between promotions, job-offers from 
outside, external belongings and the prestige of different groups (March and Simon 1958, 
Lægreid and Olsen 1984). 
 
Strong identification with a specific organization, institution, or role can threaten the 
coherence of the larger system. It has, in particular, been asked to what degree political 
order is achievable in multi-cultural societies where it is normatively problematic and 
probably impossible to create common identities through the traditional nation-building 
techniques (Weber 1977). For example, in the European Union, national identities are 
dominant. Identities are, nevertheless, increasingly influenced by issues and networks 
that cross national boundaries and there is no single center with control over education, 
socialization and indoctrination (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer 2004, Checkel 2005). The 
vision of “constitutional patriotism” reflects a belief in the forming capacity of shared 
institutions and that political participation will fashion a post-national civic European 
identity (Habermas 1994). Still, it is difficult to balance the development of common 
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political institutions and the protection of cultural diversity. It is argued that the EU will 
face deadlock if governance aims at cultural homogeneity and that the EU needs 
institutions that protect cultural diversity as a foundation for political unity and collective 
identity, without excluding the possibility of transforming current identities (Kraus 2004).   
  
Over the last few years, students of political institutions have over the last few years 
learned more about the potential and the limitations of institutional impacts on policy and 
political actors. More is known about the processes through which individuals are 
transformed into office-holders and rule-followers with an ethos of self-discipline, 
impartiality and integrity; into self-interested, utility maximizing actors; or into 
cooperating actors oriented towards the policy-networks they participate in. More is also 
known about the processes through which senses of civic identities and roles are learned, 
lost and redefined (March and Olsen 1995, Olsen 2005). Still, accomplishments are 
dwarfed by the number of unanswered questions about the processes that translate 
structures and rules into political impacts and the factors that impinge upon them under 
different conditions. This is also true for how institutional order impacts the dynamics of 
institutional change. 
 
These interests in describing the effects of institutions are supplemented by interests in 
designing them, particularly in designing them for democratic political systems. The 
more difficult it is to specify or follow stable rules, the more democracies must rely on 
institutions that encourage collective interpretation through social processes of 
interaction, deliberation and reasoning. Political debates and struggles then connect 
institutional principles and practices and relate them to the larger issues, how society can 
and ought to be organized and governed. Doing so, they fashion and re-fashion collective 
identities and defining features of the polity - its long-term normative commitments and 
causal beliefs, its concepts of the common good, justice, and reason, and its organizing 
principles and power relations.   
 
Legitimacy depends not only on showing that actions accomplish appropriate objectives, 
but also that actors behave in accordance with legitimate procedures ingrained in a 
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culture (Meyer and Rowan 1977, March and Olsen 1986). There is, furthermore, no 
perfect positive correlation between political effectiveness and normative validity. The 
legitimacy of structures, processes and substantive efficiency do not necessarily coincide. 
There are illegitimate but technically efficient means, as well as legitimate but inefficient 
means (Merton 1938). In this perspective, institutions and forms of government are 
assessed partly according to their ability to foster the virtue and intelligence of the 
community. That is, how they impact citizens’ identities, character and preferences - the 
kind of person they are and want to be (Mill 1962: 30-35, Rawls 1993: 269).  
 
Institutional order and change 
The dynamics of institutional change include elements of design, competitive selection, 
and the accidents of external shocks (Goodin 1996: 24-25). Rules, routines, norms, and 
identities are both instruments of stability and arenas of change. Change is a constant 
feature of institutions and existing arrangements impact how institutions emerge and how 
they are reproduced and changed. Institutional arrangements can prescribe and proscribe, 
speed up and delay change; and a key to understanding the dynamics of change is a 
clarification of  the role of institutions within standard processes of change.  
 
Most contemporary theories assume that the mix of rules, routines, norms, and identities 
that describe institutions change over time in response to historical experience. The 
changes are neither instantaneous nor reliably desirable in the sense of moving the system 
closer to some optimum. As a result, assumptions of historical efficiency cannot be 
sustained (March and Olsen 1989, March 1994).  By “historical efficiency” we mean the 
idea that institutions become in some sense “better” adapted to their environments and 
quickly achieve a uniquely optimum solution to the problem of surviving and thriving.  
The matching of institutions, behaviors and contexts takes time and have multiple, path-
dependent equilibria. Adaptation is less automatic, less continuous, and less precise than 




The processes of change that have been considered in the literature are primarily 
processes of single-actor design (in which single individual actors or collectivities that act 
as single actors specify designs in an effort to achieve some fairly well-specified 
objectives), conflict design (in which multiple actors pursue conflicting objectives and 
create designs that reflect the outcomes of political trading and power), learning (in 
which actors adapt designs as a result of feedback from experience or by borrowing from 
others), or competitive selection (in which unvarying rules and the other elements of 
institutions compete for survival and reproduction so that the mix of rules changes over 
time).   
 
Each of these is better understood theoretically than it is empirically. Institutions have 
shown considerable robustness even when facing radical social, economic, technical and 
cultural change. It has often been assumed that the environment has a limited ability to 
select and eliminate political institutions and it has, for example, been asked whether 
governmental institutions are immortal (Kaufman 1976). In democracies political debate 
and competition has been assigned importance as sources of change. Yet, institutions 
seem sometimes to encourage and sometimes to obstruct reflection, criticism and 
opposition.  Even party structures in competitive systems can become “frozen” (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967). 
   
The ideal that citizens and their representatives should be able to design political 
institutions at will, making governing through organizing and reorganizing institutions an 
important aspect of political agency, has been prominent in both democratic ideology and 
in the literature. Nevertheless, historically the role of deliberate design, and the 
conditions under which political actors can get beyond existing structures, have been 
questioned (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1787; 1964:1, Mill 1861; 1962:1). In spite of 
accounts of the role of heroic founders and constitutional moments, modern democracies 
also seem to have limited capacity for institutional design and reform and in particular for 
achieving intended effects of reorganizations (March and Olsen 1983, Goodin 1996, Offe 
2001). Constitutions limit the legitimacy of design. The need for major intervention may 
be modest because routine processes of learning and adaptation work fairly well and the 
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capability may be constrained by inadequate causal understanding, authority and power 
(Olsen 1997). 
  
The standard model of punctuated equilibrium assumes discontinuous change. Long 
periods of institutional continuity, where institutions are reproduced, are assumed to be 
interrupted only at critical junctures of radical change, where political agency 
(re)fashions institutional structures.  In this view, institutions are the legacy of path 
dependencies, including political compromises and victories.6 Massive failure is an 
important condition for change.  
 
The assumption, that institutional structures persist unless there are external chocks, 
underestimates both intra- and inter-institutional dynamics and sources of change. 
Usually, there is an internal aspiration level pressure for change caused by enduring gaps 
between institutional ideals and institutional practices (Broderick 1970). Change can also 
be rule-governed, institutionalized in specific units or sub-units, or be generated by 
routine interpretation and implementation of rules. Typically, an institution can be 
threatened by realities that are meaningless in terms of the normative and causal beliefs 
on which it is founded, and efforts to reduce inconsistency and generate a coherent 
interpretation are a possible source of change (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 103). As 
people gradually get or loose faith in institutional arrangements, there are routine 
switches between institutional repertoires of standard operating procedures and 
structures. Reallocation of resources also impacts the capability to follow and enforce 
different rules and therefore the relative significance of alternative structures (March and 
Olsen 1995).  
 
Thus, a focus on “critical junctures” may underestimate how incremental steps can 
produce transformative results (Streeck and Thelen 2005). For example, in the post 
World War II-period most western democracies moved stepwise towards an intervening 
welfare state and a larger public sector. The Scandinavian countries, in particular, saw a 
“revolution in slow motion” (Olsen, Roness and Sætren 1982). Since the end of the 1970s 
most western democracies have moved incrementally in a neo-liberal direction, 
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emphasizing voluntary exchange, competitive markets and private contracts rather than 
political authority and democratic politics. Suleiman, for example, argues that the reforms 
add up to a dismantling of the state. There has been a tendency to eliminate political 
belongings and ties and turn citizens into customers. To be a citizen requires a 
commitment and a responsibility beyond the self. To be a customer requires no such 
commitment and a responsibility only to oneself (Suleiman 2003: 52, 56). 
 
Institutions face what is celebrated in theories of adaptation as the problem of balancing 
exploitation and exploration. Exploitation involves using existing knowledge, rules and 
routines that are seen as encoding the lessons of history. Exploration involves exploring 
knowledge, rules and routines that might come to be known (March 1991). Rules and 
routines are the carriers of accumulated knowledge and generally reflect a broader and a 
longer experience than the experience that informs any individual actor. By virtue of their 
long-term adaptive character, they yield outcome distributions that are characterized by 
relatively high means. By virtue of their short-term stability and their shaping of 
individual actions, they give those distributions relatively high reliability (low 
variability). In general, following the rules provides a higher average return and a lower 
variance on returns than does a random draw from a set of deviant actions proposed by 
individuals. The adaptive character of rules (and thus of institutions) is, however, 
threatened by their stability and reliability. Although violation of the rules is unlikely to 
be a good idea, it sometimes is; and without experimentation with that possibility, the 
effectiveness of the set of rules decays with time.   
 
It is obvious that any system that engages only in exploitation will become obsolescent in 
a changing world, and that any system that engages only in exploration will never realize 
the potential gains of its discoveries. What is less obvious, indeed is ordinarily 
indeterminate, is the optimal balance between the two. The indeterminacy stems from the 
way in which the balance depends on trade-offs across time and space that are 
notoriously difficult to establish. Adaptation itself tends to be biased against exploration.  
Since the returns to exploitation are typically more certain, sooner, and more in the 
immediate neighborhood than are the returns to exploration, adaptive systems often 
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extinguish exploratory options before accumulating sufficient experience with them to 
assess their value. As a result, one of the primary concerns in studies of institutional 
change is with the sources of exploration. How is the experimentation necessary to 
maintain effectiveness sustained in a system infused with the stability and reliability 
characteristic of exploitation (March 1991)? 
 
Most theories of institutional change or adaptation, however, seem to be exquisitely 
simple relative to the reality of institutions that is observed.  While the concept of 
institution assumes some internal coherence and consistency, conflict is also endemic in 
institutions. It can not be assumed that conflict is solved through the terms of some prior 
agreement (constitution, coalition agreement or employment contract) and that all 
participants agree to be bound by institutional rules. There are tensions, “institutional 
irritants” and antisystems, and the basic assumptions on which an institution is 
constituted are never fully accepted by the entire society (Eisenstadt 1965: 41, Goodin 
1996: 39). There are also competing institutional and group belongings. For instance, 
diplomacy as an institution involves an inherent tension between being the carrier of the 
interests and policies of a specific state and the carrier of transnational principles, norms 
and rules maintained and enacted by the representatives of the states in mutual interaction 
(Bátora 2005).   
 
Institutions, furthermore, operate in an environment populated by other institutions 
organized according to different principles and logics. No contemporary democracy 
subscribes to a single set of principles, doctrines and structures. While the concept 
"political system" suggests an integrated and coherent institutional configuration, 
political orders are never perfectly integrated. They routinely face institutional 
imbalances and collisions (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, Olsen 2004, Orren and Skowronek 
2004) and “politics is eternally concerned with the achievement of unity from diversity” 
(Wheeler 1975: 4). Therefore, we have to go beyond a focus on how a specific institution 
affects change and attend to how the dynamics of change can be understood in terms of 
the organization, interaction and collisions among competing institutional structures, 
norms, rules, identities, and practices.   
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Within a common set of generalized values and beliefs in society, modernity involved a 
large-scale institutional differentiation between institutional spheres with different 
organizational structures, normative and causal beliefs, vocabularies, resources, histories 
and dynamics. Institutional interrelations varied and changed. Institutions came to be 
specialized, differentiated, autonomous and autopoietic – self-referential and self-
produced with closure against influence from the environment (Teubner 1993). There are 
strains and tensions and at transformative points in history institutions can come in direct 
confrontation. In different time periods the economy, politics, organized religion, science 
etc. can all lead or be lead and one can not be completely reduced either to anotheror to 
some transcendent spirit (Gerth and Mills 1970: 328-57, Weber 1978: 489). 
 
A distinction, then, has to be made between change within fairly stable institutional and 
normative frameworks and change in the frameworks themselves. For example, there are 
routine tensions because modern society involves several criteria of truth and truth-
finding. It makes a difference whether an issue is defined as a technical, economic, legal, 
moral or political question and there are clashes between, for instance, legal and scientific 
conceptions of reality, their starting assumptions, and methods of truth-finding and 
interpretation (Nelken 1993: 151). Likewise, there are tensions between what is accepted 
as “rational”, “just” and a “good argument” across institutional contexts. Different 
institutions are, for instance, based on different conceptions of both procedural fairness 
and outcome fairness and through their practices they generate different expectations 
about how interaction will be organized and different actors will be treated (Isaac, 
Mathieu and Zajac 1991: 336, 339).  
 
There are also situations where an institution has its raison d’être, mission, wisdom, 
integrity, organization, performance, moral foundation, justice, prestige, and resources 
questioned and it is asked whether the institution contributes to society what it is 
supposed to contribute. There are radical intrusions and attempts to achieve ideological 
hegemony and control over other institutional spheres; as well as stern defense of 
institutional mandates and traditions against invasion of alien norms. An institution under 
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serious attack is likely to reexamine its ethos, codes of behavior, primary allegiances, and 
its pact with society (Merton 1942). There is rethinking, reorganization, refinancing and 
possibly a new “constitutional” settlement, rebalancing core institutions. Typically, 
taken-for-granted beliefs and arrangements are challenged by new or increased contact 
between previously separated polities or institutional spheres based on different 
principles (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 107-108). 
 
Contemporary systems cope with diversity in a variety of ways. Inconsistencies are 
buffered by institutional specialization, separation, autonomy, sequential attention, local 
rationality and conflict avoidance (Cyert and March 1963). Inconsistencies are also 
debated in public and a well functioning public sphere is seen as a prerequisite for coping 
with diversity (Habermas 1994). Modern citizens have lost some of the naïve respect and 
emotional affection for traditional authorities and the legitimacy of competing principles 
and structures have to be based on communicative rationality and claims of validity. 
Their relative merits have to be tested and justified through collective reasoning, making 
them vulnerable to arguments, including demands for exceptions and exemptions that can 
restrict their scope (Kratochwil 1984: 701).     
 
In general, the Enlightenment-inspired belief in institutional design in the name of 
progress is tempered by limited human capacity for understanding and control. The 
institutional frames within which political actors act impact their motivations and their 
capabilities, and reformers are often institutional gardeners more than institutional 
engineers (March and Olsen 1983, 1989, Olsen 2000). They can reinterpret rules and 
codes of behavior, impact causal and normative beliefs, foster civic and democratic 
identities and engagement, develop organized capabilities, and improve adaptability 
(March and Olsen 1995). Yet, they can not do so arbitrarily and there is modest 
knowledge about the conditions under which they are likely to produce institutional 
changes that generate intended and desired substantive effects. 
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The frontier of institutionalism 
As the enthusiasm for “new institutional” approaches has flourished over the last twenty 
years, so also has the skepticism. It has been asked whether institutional accounts really 
present anything new; whether their empirical and theoretical claims can be sustained; 
whether their explanations are falsifiable; and whether institutional accounts can be 
differentiated from other accounts of politics (Jordan 1990, Peters 1999).  
 
It has, however, turned out to be difficult to understand legislatures (Gamm and Huber 
2002), public administration (Olsen 2005), courts of law (Clayton and Gillman 1999) and 
diplomacy (Bátora 2005) without taking into account their institutional characteristics. It 
has also been argued that the study of institutions in political science has been taken 
forward (Lowndes: 2002: 97); that “there is a future for the institutional approach” 
(Rhodes 1995); and even that the variety of new institutionalisms have “great power to 
provide an integrative framework” and may represent the “next revolution” in political 
science (Goodin and Klingeman 1996: 25).  
 
The “new institutionalism” tries to avoid unfeasible assumptions that require too much of 
political actors, in terms of normative commitments (virtue), cognitive abilities (bounded 
rationality), and social control (capabilities). The rules, routines, norms, and identities of 
an “institution”, rather than micro rational individuals or macro social forces, are the 
basic units of analysis. Yet the spirit is to supplement rather than reject alternative 
approaches (March and Olsen 1998, 2006, Olsen 2001). Much remains, however, before 
the different conceptions of political institutions, action and change can be reconciled 
meaningfully.  
  
The fact that political practice in contemporary political systems now seems to precede 
understanding and justification may, however, permit new insights. Political science is to 
a large extent based upon the study of the sovereign, territorial state and the Westphalian 
state-system. Yet the hierarchical role of the political center within each state and the 
“anarchic” relations between states are undergoing major transformations, for example in 
the European Union. An implication is that there is a need for new ways of describing 
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how authority, rights, obligations, interaction, attention, experience, memory and 
resources are organized, beyond hierarchies and markets (Brunsson and Olsen 1998). 
Network institutionalism is one candidate for understanding both intra- and inter-
institutional relations (Lowndes 2002).     
 
There is also a need to go beyond rational design and environmental dictates as the 
dominant logics of institutional change (Brunsson and Olsen 1998). There is a need for 
improved understanding of the processes that translate political action into institutional 
change, how an existing institutional order impacts the dynamics of change, and what 
other factors can be decisive. The list of questions is long, indeed (Thelen 1999, Orren 
and Skowronek 2004, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Which institutional characteristics favor 
change and which make institutions resistant to change? Which factors are likely to 
disrupt established patterns and processes of institutional maintenance and regeneration? 
What are the interrelations between change in some (parts of) institutions and continuity 
in others, and between incremental adaptation and periods of radical change? Under what 
conditions does incremental change give a consistent and discernable direction to change 
and how are the outcomes of critical junctures translated into lasting legacies? Which 
(parts of) political institutions are understood and controlled well enough to be designed 
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